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Internalisation of Markets and  
Internal Entrepreneurship:  
Competition or Co-operation?* 
Ulrich Brinkmann 
 
This text deals with two of the most popular concepts of organizational 
marketization: “intrapreneurship“ (corporate entrepreneurship) and the 
“internalisation of markets“. Historical roots and their development  
are subject of discussion as well as their internal logics, their mutual  
complementarity, and potential contradictions. Normally both concepts 
comprise the staging of enlarged rooms for participation while at the same 
time couple employees to market risks they can hardly control. Further-
more the intrapreneur concept is highly contradictory and faces those  
affected with problems they can barely solve. 
Key words: intrapreneurship (corporate entrepreneurship),  
internal markets, cooperation, competition, role conflicts 
 
1.  Shifting of market demarcations (SMD) 
In the last two decades the “praise of the market” has become one of the 
dominant phenomena not only in economics but in general. Even more: the 
                                           
*  This text is a short and revised version of a chapter of my book (“Die unsichtbare 
Faust des Marktes. Betriebliche Kontrolle und Koordination im Finanzmarktkapita-
lismus”, Brinkmann 2011). I owe Janos Kovacs (IWM, Vienna) a lot of thanks since 
he inspired the first version of the argumentation and helped me to finance a fellow-
ship at his institute in Vienna in the context of his EU-research   
(http://www.dioscuriproject.net/). 
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“logic of market capitalism” (Aglietta 2000; Dörre/Röttger 2003; Windolf 
2005), this market-centred desembedding of the economic sphere seems to 
have become a hegemonic approach. This change finds its echo in real poli-
tics, too: More and more formerly market-free zones in society such as social 
welfare systems have become the target for commodification ambitions and 
privatisation processes, and even politics nowadays likes to define itself as a 
process of management. In keeping with the times, managers of enterprises 
themselves have discovered the “shifting of market demarcations” (SMD) as 
a modern instrument for the reorganisation of the enterprise and redistribu-
tion of responsibilities and “liberty”, too. 
Though “market centring” often claims to be a quasi-teleological con-
straint, neither the relationship between market and non-market zones nor the 
direction of the future development between them is defined “naturally“. On 
the contrary: It is appropiate to describe these processes as shifting of market 
demarcations in order to get the protagonists and their strategies into the 
focus of research.  
Nevertheless this change on the organisational level can only be under-
stood in its complexity by taking into consideration the implications of 
changes in society. Politics in society, micropolitics in organisations and 
subject politics on the individual level, support each other by mutually ex-
changing fragments of ideology and argumentation logic. This universality is 
part of the system that makes market appellations so attractive. Subcontract-
ing, freelancers, temp workers or limited contracts for work as well as incen-
tive pay, “trust-based“ working hours, centre structures, internal markets or 
outsourcing: the potential opportunities for using the market as an instrument 
seem to have no limits. 
This is how insecure areas arise in formerly “fordistically“ pacified zones, 
employees and their works councils suddenly find themselves in conflicts 
about demarcation problems which they thought they had overcome long ago. 
The SMD between organisation and environment, as well as within the 
organisations, nowadays seems to make the “border incident” a normal 
micropolitical incident. In the retinue of these radical changes more and more 
employees turn willy-nilly to cross-border commuters (Brinkmann 2004) or 
“Grenz-“Beschäftigte – a wordplay in German where the word “Grenze“ has 
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the meaning of “border“ as well as of “margin“ – the latter indicating that 
living near one of these new demarcations can turn you into a precarious 
margin(al)-employee. 
Finally the rise of a new role model, the intrapreneur, i.e. the entrepreneur 
inside the enterprise, contributes to the general impression of a universal new 
approach. The concept of the intrapreneur is in the “eye of the storm“ of 
normative approach of the internalisation of markets; it represents its logical 
core on the individual level.  
The intention of this description is not to raise the impression that its far-
reaching hegemony means a hermetic seclusion of the market centred way of 
thinking. There are on all levels (society, organisation, individual) not only 
practices of support, but also of resistance – nurtured by “the alternative 
world views", but also by experiences of estrangement and submission. These 
resistant protagonists take part in the SMD by, according to their interests, 
enforcing or fighting them; as empirical research tells us by using a variety of 
forms between legal co-determination and illegal sabotage or the like. 
Sketching the market topic like this draws it back from the common natural-
ising teleology to an area of the feasible. Political action on all levels regains 
a meaning and purpose.  
This is how, from an agency theoretical point of view, behind the “ano-
nymisation“ of control (Castells 1996), the acting protagonists become 
visible, and political action on the other hand regains the character of proc-
esses whose results are not determined. It is true that common conceptions 
like “marketisation“ describe current trends, but they underexpose the spe-
cific way this SMD politically gains or loses acceptance, and thus these 
conceptions represent the process too much as a one way street. 
At first this text examines the topic of internalising markets before it gets 
to the core point, the discussion of intrapreurship as a specific form of organ-
isational marketising strategies. 
2.  Internal markets  
The pressure to change enterprises finds its echo in the intraorganisational 
processes, structures and benchmarks, too. The permanent search for the 
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specific contribution a single employee, department or even enterprise within 
a group adds to the creation of value of the entire organisation is a typical 
indicator for this pressure. 
Within the last few years the central mechanisms for the coordination and 
control of a social interaction in working systems, work relations and tran-
sorganisational relations (Sorge 1993) the market has considerably won the 
upper hand compared with “bureaucratic power“ or “associative forms“. If 
one trusts the renowned Harvard Business Review, the “Internal Markets“ 
concept is about to enter the Mount Olympus of management approaches 
(Hamel 2006: 80). The promises connected to this SMD are far reaching and 
full-bodied: “Internal markets bring all the advantages of free markets inside 
large organisations “, the authors of the first bestseller regarding this topic 
state ("Internal Markets: Bringing The Power of Free Enterprise Inside Your 
Organization “, Geranmayeh et al 1993: 4).  
Inside the organisation the model responds mainly to two problems: on 
the one hand the shrinking control capacities of the corporate management in 
modern complex enterprises: with their output orientation, internal markets 
represent a control simplification for the management. On the other hand it 
offers an answer to the challenge of guaranteeing innovations inside the 
enterprise. That is why in the context of the intrapreneurship concepts based 
on Schumpeter’s entrepreneur idea (cf. below) the assumptions can be found 
that bureaucratic and matrix organisations are hardly able to ensure the 
necessary degree of innovation (Välikangas 2001); this claim leads to the 
postulation that a decentralisation of decisions, responsibility and risks is to 
be organised: “Like oil and water, innovation and bureaucracy just don’t 
mix“ (Ross 1987b: 23). The traditional thinking in a hierarchical vocabulary 
is therefore translated into entrepreneurial equivalents. Instead of departments 
and hierarchical assignments, one finds the notion of internal entrepreneurial 
activities. Thus the conception of internal markets represents the central logic 
for cost- and profit-centre structures, generally implying the partial delega-
tion of managerial and entrepreneurial risk, and at the same time promising 
more freedom for the individual affected by the restructuring, ase in the case 
of Hewlett Packard: “The financial controls are very tight, what is loose is 
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how (people) meet those goals”, (see Halal 1996: 36; similar with IBM cf. 
Glißmann/Peters 2001). 
There is a controversial debate about the actual empirical spread of these 
phenomena; however, everyone agrees that the direction of the SMD is clear 
at present: “A growing number of companies are explicitly replacing bureau-
cratic internal resource allocation with internal markets“ (Ellig 2001: 227). 
Theoretically there are hardly any limits set to the construction of internal 
supplier customer relations. In different roles, even an individual can take 
several market roles inside an organisation. In principle, the conceptual basic 
assumption is that “all market functions can be replicated within organisa-
tions“ (Halal 1994a: 741). Like a lot of other representatives of the approach 
Halal considers his own normative pre-considerations already an empirical 
reality, though: “Some hierarchy will always be needed, but the former 
management system in which decisions flowed from the top down is now 
history“ (Halal 1997: 18). This mis-identification of wish and reality is, as 
will be shown below, one of the central problems of his approach. 
These considerations raise the question of the reasons for the current dis-
cursive dominance of positions like these. The wide spread of internal market 
concepts among enterprises nowadays is not a matter of chance. In the period 
of rise of the small and dynamic dot-com-start-ups the old-established market 
leaders changed their orientation with regards to hierarchy, too. Nevertheless 
this phase at the end of the 1990s already represented the third push, because 
at the beginning of the 1980s intraorganisational competition (as a base for an 
economic excellence) was discussed broadly in the course of the U.S. debate 
about the putative Japanese superiority (Peters/Waterman 1982) for the first 
time. These concepts then experienced a boost in the wake of the decline of 
the state socialism after 1989/1990. 
Numerous pieces of evidence for this assumption can be found, but not 
always as explicit as in the case of Halal: “Major corporations comprise 
economic systems that are as large and complex as national economies, yet 
they are commonly viewed as ‘firms’ to be managed by executives who 
                                           
1 Since Halal is one of the most quoted authors with regards to the internal markets 
approach he will be prominently quoted in the following. 
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move resources about like a portfolio of investments, form global strategies, 
restructure the organisation, and set financial targets. How does this differ 
from of the central planning that failed in the Communist bloc? Why would 
such control be bad for a national economy but good for a corporate econ-
omy? Can any fixed structure remain useful for long in a world of constant 
changes?“ (Halal 1996: 31)  
Generally the basic idea is to outline the triumph of the market in the East 
European societies, then to transfer the argument to large (and in the further 
course also to smaller) enterprises and finally return from the organisation 
back to the society level again, for which authors like Halal develop a market 
utopia (see below for details): “Transforming organisations into market 
systems is formidable because it involves a profound social upheaval; it could 
be thought of as ‘Corporate Perestroika’, somewhat like the struggle facing 
the post socialistic bloc“ (Halal 1996: 48). The consequences of such a 
reorganisation are not played down: “Many will think this challenge is too 
enormous, but that is exactly what we once thought about the prospect of 
changing the Soviet Union. The shift to market organisations seems likely to 
roll on because internal markets offer the same powerful advantages that 
inspired the overthrow of Communism: opportunities for personal achieve-
ment, liberation from authority, accountability for performance, entrepreneu-
rial initiative, creative innovation, high quality and service, ease of handling 
complexity, fast reaction time, and flexibility for change“ (Halal 1996: 49). 
The liberty promise (in the sense as a liberation from bureaucratic compul-
sions) is ubiquitous: “It is important to allow all units the freedom to conduct 
business transactions both inside and outside the firm. Without that freedom, 
managers are subject to the monopoly and bureaucracy of central controls, in 
much the same way the Soviets over-controlled their economy“ (Halal 1994 
a: 73).  
Two more trends strengthen the internal markets-position in the dis-
courses: internal markets fit very well (in)to the long-term trend (with short 
interruptions) towards decentralisation of enterprises in post-war fordism 
(multi multidivisional form, Chandler 1995 (1962)). The intrapreneur be-
comes a signum of this development because in society a generalisation of 
entrepreneurial attitudes (Prisching 2000; Bill/Bjerke/Johansson 2010) can be 
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noticed. At the same time imitation processes take place which discursively 
and structurally transport internal markets and intrapreneurship (Di-
Maggio/Powell 1983). 
If one summarises these numerous promises, arguments at three different 
levels of personal self-realisation, increase of organisational efficiency and 
progress in society can be found (for simplification purposes going back to 
Halal’s oeuvre):  
– “shift to democracy”, “after a long history of authoritarian control“ (1997: 
18) 
– “free up the skills, creativity, an vision of ordinary people“ (1998b: 23) 
– overcoming of “top-down disadvantages of hierarchy“ (1999) 
– self-determination: “gaining control over their operations“ (1997: 18) 
– reduction of complexity (1999) 
– overcoming of managerial control problems: “In a world of escalating 
complexity and empowered people, leadership must cultivate the art of 
helping others to share the responsibilities of management“ (1998a: 13) 
– “to advance social progress“ (1999). 
The “innovation question“ functions as a hinge between the internal markets 
debate and the intrapreneurship concepts. In principle these approaches can 
be outlined separately, too: intrapreneurship does not presuppose necessarily 
internalised markets and vice versa. But in the scientific literature on intra-
preneurship no contribution can be found that does not refer the idea of 
internal entrepreneurs to the concept of internal markets. To express it in the 
terminology of the SMD: the intrapreneur is the role model of commodified 
work and thus is the counter concept to the de-commodified fordist “normal 
worker“. As such he represents the end of the process of SMD into the or-
ganisation when the demarcations reach the individuals now representing 
market entities themselves. The intrapreneur is still an employed member of 
the enterprise; this differentiates him from the freelancer without organisa-
tional membership. Conceptually intrapreneurship is therefore discussed as a 
special case of the internal-market debate: while internal markets transfer 
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risks and responsibilities to new protagonists the idea of the entrepreneur 
inside the organisation goes one step beyond: he is made responsible for the 
innovation demands. At the same time this change modifies the understand-
ing of market itself, since it requires a new mixture of intraorganisational 
competition and co-operation. 
3.  Intrapreneurship  
There are diverse theoretical overlappings and thus possibilities for a mutual 
connection between the two approaches. Internal market supporters stress the 
perspective that during the re-conceptualisation of organisational processes 
and structures the role definitions of the former “position owners“ also 
transform significantly: “Whereas it made sense to treat people as employees 
in a hierarchy, an internal market system requires people to assume the role 
of entrepreneurs“ (Halal 1994a: 80). Halal and other exponents of the concept 
see the last and finite fulfilment of the market internalisation in the realisation 
of an “intraprise“ structure to gain all the advantages of the market principle: 
“accountability for results, entrepreneurial freedom, incentives for achieve-
ment, rapid response time, customer focus, and creativity“ (Halal 1999).  
On the other hand, authors like Pinchot emphatically emphasise that “so 
far no human institution has been discovered to organise complex phenomena 
as efficiently as the market“ (Pinchot 1988: 359). Gifford Pinchot is generally 
regarded as the founder of the intrapreneurship-idea and its first central 
advocate. Even the forming of the notion is attributed to him: “I call them 
‘intrapreneurs’ – my abbreviation of ‘intracorporate entrepreneur’“ (Pinchot 
1988: 10). Alternative notions like “internal corporate venture“ (Burgel-
man/Sayles 1987) or “corporate entrepreneurship “ (Gautam/Verma 1997; for 
an overview cf. Sharma/Chrisman 1999) could not gain high acceptance 
either in the consulting or in the scientific community. Instead of delivering a 
differentiated definition at the beginning, we turn to specific facets of this 
concept in the following.  
The concept of Intrapreneurship is not an exclusive phenomenon of the 
Anglo-Saxon variants of capitalism; this can be proved if one carries out an 
enquiry in the relevant print media databases (like lexisnexis or the like). 
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Hundreds of entries can be found in all important German papers with an 
increasing trend. Moreover in the current Bertelsmann studies on corporate 
culture and leadership style intrapreneurs (“Unternehmer im Unternehmen”) 
have recently made it into the top ten “central elements of successful corpo-
rate cultures“ (see Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003). Finally this concept has 
entered many enterprises within the last few years. Intrapreneurs, “the dream-
ers who do“ (Pinchot), seem to be the substance the dreams of many manag-
ers and owners are made of today. In empirical studies we find particularly in 
small and medium-sized enterprises the more or less explicit wish for em-
ployees to “follow the model of the company’s founder/owner", generally 
stated by the owners themselves or by the managers in charge. The owners’ 
desire to make the employees a copy of themselves is, in a historical perspec-
tive, not the latest news. The main character in Upton Sinclair’s literary 
biography of Henry Ford (1983 (1937): 48) already demands: “He knew his 
aim: He wanted to change people’s habits. It wanted to make them persons 
like himself. Rational, honest and hard-working persons like himself“. One 
can doubt whether the paternalistic Henry Ford could have accepted the idea 
of an intrapreneur in his own company, though. Probably he would have 
disliked the degree of potential empowerment connected to this idea for 
example by the assignment of decision-rights to employees. 
Thus the implicit basic idea of intrapreneurship is to combine the best of 
the two worlds of innovative entrepreneurship and dependent occupation. 
Why is that? Art Fry, the inventor of the yellow post-it-notes, presumably 
represents the basic myth of all intrapreneurs. 3M as an enterprise profited 
from the fact that this employee did not set up his own start-up with his 
innovative idea, but remained inside the enterprise despite initially numerous 
hurdles. For a too long period it was primarily isolated cases like this, that 
served as a proof in literature (Fry 1988), this is why this text now turns to 
the theoretical implications of the approach. 
Now the question is to be answered what the specific advantages with in-
trapreneurship for organisations are: advantages that reach beyond the con-
cept of internal markets outlined above.  
Almost all arguments are related to the problem of the “labyrinth of bu-
reaucratic systems“ (Pinchot 1988: 29) and its inherent innovation problems 
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(Sørensen 2007). In the metaphorical consultants’ language the actual sur-
vival of every enterprise depends on the efficiency of the organisational 
innovation motors: “Face it: Out there in some garage, an entrepreneur is 
forging a bullet with your company’s name on it. You’ve got one option: you 
have to shoot first“ (Hamel 1999: 72). “Intrapreneurs will be the decisive 
tools", as Pinchot (1988: 11) makes the point, “for whether your enterprise is 
successful or not. The loss of an entrepreneuring talent will be costly because 
it means more than the loss of a capable engineer or marketing expert. Intra-
preneurs are the integrators combining the abilities of the technicians and 
marketing people by developing new products, methods and services. With-
out them the innovation will fall by the wayside or it will move in the snail’s 
pace of bureaucratic processes“. Following this view intrapreneurs act as a 
rejuvenation cure for the organisation. Thus the “War for Talent“ (McKinsey 
study of 1997; as a book: Michaels et al 2001), the struggle for those innova-
tive employees like knowledge workers is the core of farsighted Human 
Resource Managers. Their arsenal has to be extended by the “weapon“ of 
intrapreneurship now: “Enterprises that do not manage to keep their best and 
most innovative employees inside the firm will be confronted with the inac-
tive ones. Without realising it this enterprise very soon is crowded with “deac 
bodies“ (Pinchot 1988: 36) 
These efforts are even more urgent if one relies on Schumpeter’s idea that 
firms cannot assume that the main innovations (the putting through of “new 
combinations“ cf. Schumpeter 1997 (1911): chapter. 2 III) will be made by 
organisation members but grow outside the traditional organizational bounda-
ries. “It is not usual that the new combinations are realised by the same 
people who are busy with keeping those conventional production processes 
going that might be replaced with the new innovative ones. Instead the new 
idea and the new norm or the firms representing it generally do not replace 
the former ones but are set up next to these since the old ones tend not to be 
able to go the necessary step beyond. To give an example: in general it was 
not the postmasters who founded the railways.“ This way the attempt of 
owners to get back to the roots of their success therefore always reminds one 
of trying to square the circle. Against this view the advocates of the intrapre-
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neurship conception just emphasize the advantages of intra-organisational 
innovation.  
Exponents of the concept do not only refer to classical arguments like the 
use of professional research and development capacities, existing technology, 
experienced marketing and financial resources but they stress “softer“ argu-
mentation lines, too, that point to a consciousness that many of them are 
lacking in other contexts. Primarily theses soft arguments aim at those com-
parative advantages offered by established trust relations for team-
cooperation (Meifert 2003). The founding of trust for extra-organisational 
exchange relations is usually costly and time expensive.  
The other frequent argument is that innovation usually requires a temporal 
and local shelter, within which the intrapreneur must be enabled to develop a 
seedling into a strong plant. The point here is that in the end transaction (that 
is control-) costs should be avoided that a possible distrust relation would 
cause. This is why Pinchot expects (1988: chapt. 4) the necessary form of 
trustful communication only inside the organisation making sure that trade 
secrets are kept as well as dangers of idea theft or sabotage are minimised.  
What are on the other hand the promises for these employees who are now 
responsible for innovative progress?  
Due to famous theoretical positions in economic theory (e.g. von Hayek 
1976), the switch to market control as the central structuring principle in-
duces a rationalisation of socio-economic relations, and reduces the depend-
ence of person-related relationships. Some authors describe this change as a 
“de-feudalisation“ of the management-employee relations (e.g. Reiss 2000) 
as well as as an increase of freedom for the employees: “Units are converted 
into intraprises by accepting controls on performance in return for freedom of 
operations“ (Halal 1996: 36).  
Thus one can assume that significant parts of the employees hold the con-
cepts of intrapreneurship in high esteem, because of the turn back of taylorist 
work organisation and the parallel creation of “zones of controlled auton-
omy“ (Dörre 2001) since their desire for “performance optimisation“ (Pon-
gratz/Voß 2002: 140-149) and their “contribution orientation“ (Kotthoff 
1997) might be fulfilled under the new circumstances. This is the wish for 
“normative subjectivation“ early identified by Baethge (1991) which now re-
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appears in the current debate on subjectivation (in line with Foucault’s ap-
proach) as “postulating subjectivity“ (Kleemann 2002). Especially the “high-
flyers“ prefer the rise of their autonomy in the new working contexts (Brink-
mann 2011: chapter 6). In addition recent empirical studies point out that the 
introduction of management by objectives as part of strategies of SMD into 
the organisation for the first even empowered low qualified employees since 
it protected them against arbitrary unreasonable demands of supervisors.  
Resuming there are different promises for potential intrapreneurs: 
– a rationalisation of firm-internal social relations;  
– the top-down-delegation of autonomy and responsibility;  
– the fulfilment of subjective postulations and ambitions with regards to 
work;  
– breaking down bureaucratic blockades and creation of an innovative and 
dynamic work context;  
– an improvement of “adequate and fairer pay“. 
But which are the enterprises where intrapreneurship can be installed? The 
first advocates of the idea (e.g. Burgelman 1983) still assumed, possibly 
under the impression of the debates about “manager capitalism", that it would 
be necessary to turn over Schumpeter’s logic according to which successful 
entrepreneurs with a growing enterprise size become managers: employees in 
large-scale enterprises should become internal entrepreneurs to speed up the 
ailing innovation process again. As time went on, however, this concept was 
also transferred to smaller enterprises (among others see Zahra/Pearce 1994). 
In empirical studies we nowadays find emphatic management supporters of 
concept in almost all enterprise size classes (see Benthin/Brinkmann 2008). 
In small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) both managers and owners 
themselves proclaim the age of the intrapreneur. Empirical evidence shows 
that it is less often the industrial sector or the size of the enterprise than the 
preference structure or the managerial leadership style that helps to push the 
concept through. Precondition is an openness for management fashions, as 
well as a readiness to delegate certain competences. 
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With owners of SMEs, some further prerequisites are given: in this size 
class we find less hierarchical levels to slow down the forceful realisation of 
the concept. And the opposite logic is true, too: “Intrapreneurs can be first-
class allies for owner-managers of growing small businesses“ (Carrier 1996: 
7). But: Corporate culture research stresses the importance to establish the 
myth of a founding “hero“ for the cohesion of an organisation. Every newly 
appearing intrapreneur now represents a rival “hero“ and a legend of his own 
competing with the original enterprise founder: “Great intrapreneurs should 
end up the heroes and heroines of the company“ (Southon/West 2005: 25). 
This can become a major problem if the founder entrepreneur is not willing to 
accept this. The research in intrapreneurship deals with this conflict, too, by 
stating that the owner can be “the main brake or, conversely, the main cata-
lyst in the emergence of intrapreneurship within the firm“ (Carrier 1996: 16).  
According to its supporters, the concept is not only universal with regards 
to enterprise size classes, but also to almost all positions (hierarchically and 
functionally). Potential intrapreneurs can be found in all employee groups, 
from top management to the shop floor (Geisler 1993; Reitz 1998; Pongracic 
2009). Nevertheless the roots of this optimistic view remain vague. Pinchot 
himself assumes that it requires special protagonists, who can gain accep-
tance inside the enterprises. So he seriously advises the personnel depart-
ments: “It is a particularly good idea to hire farm kids. They seem to make 
good intrapreneurs. I guess farm kids grow up with a kind of a can-do attitude 
and it never occurs to them that there is anything they aren’t supposed to do. 
If the hay is on the ground, the bailer is broken and it is going to rain in six 
hours, you don’t worry that you don’t have a degree in bailer mechanics. 
Somehow farmers learn to get the job done.” 
4.  Paradoxes and inconsistencies 
In 1994 Halal stated in an article for the Academy of Management Executive: 
“Surveying the evolution of structure over the past decades, the movement 
from hierarchy to enterprise comprises one of the most profound changes in 
management thought.“ He may have been right on this matter. This following 
statement is found two paragraphs further: “In a decade or less the notion of 
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hierarchy may seem as archaic as the medieval belief in the divine right of 
kings“ (78). With regards to this claim he is obviously wrong. The SMD is 
not a one-way street as indicated above; it does not proceed neither straightly 
nor in a terrific speed. Demarcations can be moved back or the shifting itself 
might face significant opposition. This is due to the acting of organisational 
protagonists but also to the inner contradictions of the concept itself. 
In the following, this article will try to answer three bundles of questions: 
(a) What are the subjective preconditions for an intrapreneur? (b) How is 
he/she supposed to be embedded into the organisation? (c) What kind of 
social utopia emerges from this? 
4.1 The intrapreneur as a protagonist  
So far an intrapreneurship master plan can not be found: neither in the organ-
isational practice, nor on a conceptual level in the literature. The intrapreneur 
is confronted with a considerable role uncertainty arising from the amorphous 
design of functions and competences, as well as from the often only implicit 
discussion of the prerequisites for an intrapreneur. The headline could be: 
“Your intrapreneur, the unknown being“. He represents a mixture of “saint“ 
and “knight“ (Reitz 1998) or of “pirate“ and “player“ (Peters 1992) and the 
corresponding comments can be found on a continuum from enthusiastic 
support to deep disapproving.  
The assumption that the reference to the concept of the entrepreneur is 
rather fragmentary and very selective can be confirmed quickly. There are a 
number of hardly solvable inconsistencies between conceptional implications 
and organisational implementation. 
Voluntary or forced intrapreneur?  
The classical and many modern approaches of entrepreneur research have in 
common that they explicitly make clear that entrepreneurship is usually based 
on the will and the ability to come to rational conclusions in economic deci-
sion-making processes (Casson 2001; Chell 2008; Scheiner 2009), and 
additionally that only a volunteer can accept this role. In management litera-
ture this voluntary acceptance is attributed to the “high-flyers“ and to the 
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knowledge workers (Drucker 1998; Markus et al. 2000) but it is rather ques-
tionable if this assumption fits to employees in less exponent positions or if 
this is the case in situations of economic crisis (see Faust et al. 2000). 
Voluntariness, far-reaching competences and characteristic motives are 
indicators that entrepreneurs represent a rare species be it inside or outside an 
organisation. Therefore in the following, we look at the influential definition 
by Schumpeter and its reflection in the intrapreneurship concept. What makes 
the entrepreneur run according to Schumpeter?  
"The innovator is driven by elements that rise in his chest which make 
him want to do something extraordinary. This development requires a new 
and a different effort of will because it has to overstep the conventional daily 
work and the sorrows related to it and to struggle for a conception and draw-
ing up of a new combination. Moreover the innovator has to persuade himself 
that this is a real possibility and not only a dream or a fooling around. This 
mental freedom requires a surplus of energy exceeding the demands of the 
daily routine and it is a specific and rare phenomenon“ (Schumpeter 1997 
(1911): 125; translation by the author ). So Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is a 
visionary few and far between who sees the new in the daily routine and 
strives to make it come true. This whole concept is inevitably based on a 
voluntary constellation – you can hardly force somebody to carry out this 
role: “The typical entrepreneur does not wonder whether any effort he under-
goes promises a sufficient ‘pleasure surplus’. He hardly cares about hedonis-
tic fruits of his deeds. He cannot but work restlessly, and he has problems in 
enjoying the well-earned rest or goods“ (Schumpeter 1997 (1911): 137). The 
“ordinary fordist worker“ actually embodies the opposite to this model. He 
(or she) legitimately asks for the “pleasure surplus“ of the alienating job, his 
drive is not to live for his work but vice versa. His economic behaviour is 
based on a fundamentally different motive structure than the one of the 
prototypical entrepreneur. Once again Schumpeter: “There are the dream and 
the will to found a private empire mostly but not necessarily even a dynasty. 
(…) Moreover there is the will to fight, to be successful and to win; and 
finally there is a third motive, the pleasure in creating something new“ 
(Schumpeter 1997 (1911): 138).  
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Almost eight decades later we find identical phrases to describe the intra-
preneur in Pinchot’s texts (Pinchot 1988: 76): “The characteristic features of 
the intrapreneur’s personality are understandable as soon as one notices the 
inner pressure in a man driven by a strong vision and an irrepressible impulse 
to act. Such a person only comes to rest when his vision is manifested in the 
world as he had foreseen it. This pressure explains not only the energy of the 
intrapreneurs but also their intolerance towards orders. He is open for infor-
mation and ideas, but his actions are determined by his own inner impera-
tives. His engagement and dedication, as well as the will to finish even 
ordinary work if necessary, can be explained by the impulse to make his 
vision come true so that the intraprise is successful“. 
By sharp contrast to this the typical tertiary (professional) socialisation in 
post-war fordism tried to make sure that the employees were exposed to the 
market as little as possible. Entrepreneurial risk remained with the owners or 
their managers, on the other hand the scopes of action, participation rights 
and as well as their “intolerance towards orders“ were clearly limited. The 
fordist work organisation preferred routine rather than creative solutions. A 
major part of the employees therefore not only misses the necessary prerequi-
sites but also the desire for being an intrapreneur. Schumpeter’s assertion 
made shortly before of the rise of fordism might still be correct nowadays: 
“Where the limits of routine comes to an end, many people cannot go on“ 
(Schumpeter 1997 (1911): 118). The prerequisites do not only lie in the 
person, but also in the problematic interaction between person and organisa-
tional/social environment. This is not a new discovery, since Schumpeter 
(1997 (1911): 126) described it a century ago as the “resistance by the social 
context confronting everybody who wants to push something new, especially 
in economics“. The autobiographical notes by intrapreneurs like Art Fry, 
clearly illustrate that since then not a lot has changed with regards to the 
typical obstructionism in organisational micropolitics. Duncan states it 
politely: “Creative people are, to be honest, a pain in the neck“ (1988: 17). At 
least partially the research on intrapreneurship has taken note of this phe-
nomenon, this is why Jennings et al. (1994) or Carrier (1996) refer to the 
various developmental, socio-economic and personality related  prerequisites. 
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Due to the subjective prerequisites, the interim résumé at this point must be, 
intrapreneurship matters only to a small minority. 
Internal entrepreneur and manager of the self 
If in the course of SMD employees are requested to adopt an entrepreneurial 
attitude this is the consequent fulfilment of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur-
postulate “to develop a mentality towards economic behaviour“ (1928:477. 
The results of an ongoing internalisation of these demands have been de-
scribed in the sociological debate about the “subjectising (Subjektivierung) of 
work“ (Moldaschl/Voß 2002). Following Foucault these approaches focus the 
change of work control, namely the substitution of outside- by self-control. 
Thus the re-commodification of labour can lead to a (subject-) internal entre-
preneurship (McKinlay/Starkey 1998) presupposing a specific ability of self-
technology (Foucault 1993). The shifting of market demarcations here fulfils 
its logic by making the individual himself an object of pure market logic. 
Bröckling et al (2000) have sketched this process in the context of the debate 
about Foucault’s concept of the governmentality (Foucault 2000); they called 
it the “management of the self“ as a model of neoliberal subjectivity.  
Voß/Pongratz (1998) noted the same trend in their analysis “workforce-
entrepreneur“ (Arbeitskraftunternehmer) who will substitute the predominant 
de-commodified “ordinary fordist worker“ by enforcing his “employability“ 
through an extended self-control and self rationalisation (Pongratz/Voß 
2000). Thus market-driven work of intrapreneurs on the one hand typifies 
management’s attempt to increase productivity, by raising the treasure of 
subjective creativity potentials which were neither desired nor accessible in 
fordist relationships before. On the other hand, many employees find this 
postulate an unreasonable demand and difficult to resist because it is staged 
as an unchangeable constraint. SMD to them appears very often as an in- and 
extensification of work gathering more and more slides of their lebenswelt 
(Pickshaus et al. 2001). Since they are restricted to questions on the function-
ality of the individuals in their role segment, concepts of intrapreneurship 
(and this is an important difference to the “workforce-entrepreneur“ ap-
proaches) generally do not focus on the interdependence between, in Haber-
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mas’ words: system and lebenswelt. At short notice this perspective might 
look useful but in the long run particularly “the management of the self“ 
might be more than usual employees can cope with and thus undermine 
sustainable economising. 
Self-realisation by participation?  
Though there are reasonable doubts if the intrapreneur represents a practical 
form of entrepreneuring he might personify a specific case of “delegated 
participation“ (Greifenstein et al. 1993) in organisations where the institu-
tionalised participation is rather weak. The concept of intrapreneurship might 
probably be effectual with regards to employees where it claims to be sup-
porting the employees’ participation requests since one of its roots lies in the 
critique of incapacitation and alienation by fordist work organisation and 
corporate structures. 
The question whether internal entrepreneurship has to be understood as a 
compensation, rather than a result of weak participation remains unanswered 
by empirical research so far. Anyway in both cases it represents a competing 
principle of participation, since the intrapreneur partially leaves the tradi-
tional role of an employee and thus the coverage of the codified participation. 
Even if this happens on a voluntary basis, a clear element of uncertainty is 
connected anyway, as the research on the relationship of participation granted 
voluntarily and legal participation rights has pointed out in the last decades 
(Brinkmann/Speidel 2006). It is unclear in which way the intrapreneur will fit 
into the existing systems of industrial relations. In enterprises structured 
according to matrix determinants, the classic forms of a collective representa-
tion of interests, already the German model turned out to be less effective 
(Schmierl 1999). The white spots of participation spread even more in the 
market centred organisation: Is the works council e.g. responsibly for intra-
preneurs or not?  
It requires a look at the cultural compatibility to answer the question about 
the participatory substance of intrapreneurship. In the Anglo-Saxon capital-
ism forms of direct participation are more common than in the Rhenanian 
variant. This is why the self-realisation offer for intrapreneurs is facing 
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completely different preconditions. One look at Pinchots (1988) starting 
signal for the “Intrapreneuring”-debate makes this clear. The English book 
subtitle states “Why You Don’t Have to Leave the Corporation to Become an 
Entrepreneur"; it obviously appeals to the potential protagonist, presupposing 
that he is already thinking of exiting the enterprise and trying to keep him 
from doing so. The German translation makes the difference and offers the 
reversed viewpoint: “Intrapreneuring. Mitarbeiter als Unternehmer“ (Intra-
preneuring. Employees as entrepreneurs). This reversal happens for a good 
reason: till now, a broad bottom-up movement of intrapreneurs has not been 
seen in Germany; this rather remains a management or consultant’s wish. 
In the Anglo-Saxon as well as in the Rhenanian variant intrapreneurs re-
quire far-reaching competences and rights intervening in the existing organ-
isational power structure. This can be observed most clearly with regards to 
property rights. According to Schumpeter, entrepreneurs do not necessarily 
have to own private property of production means; without any rights of 
disposal about means of production the realisation “of new combinations“ 
might, however, hardly be practicable. If we interpret economic goods as 
bundles of rights we can identify four categories in compliance with the 
common property right analysis (see Wieland 1997: 37ff.): 
1.  the right to use/exploit goods (ius usus) 
2.  the right to form and substance of goods (ius abusus) 
3.  the right to use the outputs originating from goods (ius usus fructus) 
4. the right to transfer the goods and all rights attached to it (ius successionis). 
The concept of intrapreneurship demands this bundle of property rights to be 
undone, so that the incentive and disposal structure which is connected with 
private property of means of production is transferred to other protagonists 
like intrapreneurs without the original owners losing their ultimate control. 
Thus a new protagonist joins the already existing competition between own-
ers and managers who complicates the relation network. “The ideal arrange-
ment is to treat each unit as a small, separate company, free to manage its 
own operations and resources. It is important to allow all units the freedom to 
conduct business transactions both inside and outside the firm“ (Halal 1996: 
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36): the normative subtext of this process can be described as a democratisa-
tion promise, a “move to democracy “(Halal 1997) or an “extension of de-
mocracy“ (Halal 1996: 55 ff.).  
In accordance with Schumpeter the nature of the entrepreneur is the “rec-
ognition and realisation of new possibilities in the economic sphere", the 
dynamic entrepreneur fulfils the following tasks:  
“1. The production and selling of new products or new qualities of products,  
2.  The introduction of new production methods,  
3.  The creation of new organisations of the industry (trusts e.g.),  
4.  The discovery of new markets,  
5.  The discovery of new sources of supply“ (Schumpeter 1928: 483).  
This list clarifies that all aspects of the property rights must be seized as well 
by the entrepreneur as by the intrapreneur. This covers product and process 
innovation as well as work organisation, access to resources, the decision 
about supply and sales or questions concerning the organisational structure. 
Generally, however, one cannot assume that these rights assignment is 
granted in the necessary dimension, even if the desire for intrapreneurs is 
virtually omnipresent in the enterprise. For example in the annual meeting of 
employees a member of the executive board of a large German bank, who 
was confronted with the employees’ desires for an expansion of correspond-
ing rights according to the intrapreneur concept, answered: “This is not a 
democratic event here, the executive board decides what is done, and who 
does not accept it can leave the enterprise.“ In SMEs one can find similar 
reactions, for example the managing director of a producer of environmental 
technology, an advocate of the idea of “Unternehmer im Unternehmen“ when 
asked about the actual degree of delegation of decision-making rights, re-
sponded metaphorically that in the end “of course the coachman“ decides 
which way to go. To keep it in mind: In the case of the bank the employees 
had not at all demanded a democratisation of their enterprise, and in the 
second case it was not all about depriving the management of power. The 
suggestions fell far behind the emphatic democracy promises of the internal 
markets advocates. Nevertheless it is characteristic that the employees are cut 
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down to size with regards to such central questions about the regulation of 
disposal rights. One could take up Halal’s dictum of organisational change 
that instead of the “East European", many enterprises rather chose the “Chi-
nese“ variant of restructuring: perestroika grata, glasnost non grata. Often, the 
basic attitude of many managers regarding the delegation of participation 
rights can already be read from their dealing with the elected works councils: 
if participation lacks a corresponding culture, the granting of participation 
rights rather represents a precarious norm which at any time can be with-
drawn again. 
One has to conclude that the competences of Schumpeters dynamic entre-
preneur for realising “new combinations“ are much further-reaching than are 
generally granted to the intrapreneurs. 
4.2 The intrapreneur and the enterprise  
Amorphous roles in the “kamikaze capitalism“  
In these difficulties of the amorphous role definitions of intrapreneurship lie 
all sorts of role uncertainties, perhaps typical of a phenomen in which “the 
best of two worlds“ should be combined. First of all an inter-role-conflict as 
an employee-employer-conflict is created. This can be exemplified by dis-
cussing Pinchot’s (1988: 43) “first commandment“ for intrapreneurs. “Come 
to work each day willing to be fired“. This drastic instruction represents 
nothing but the rule to assess one’s own contribution to the enterprise output 
and to promote the own dismissal in case of too little value-adding or too low 
innovation level. This points out that these protagonists are confronted with 
absolutely incompatible role demands. The mixing of the two roles of the 
loyal employee and the innovative entrepreneur in the chimera of the intra-
preneurs underestimates that the different functions and often antagonistic 
interests produce a diffuse and contradictory role model. The embedding of 
the intrapreneurship approach in the context of the internal markets debate 
clarifies again if one looks at the solution supplied by Halal for analogous 
situations: “For instance, a market organisation can help make downsizing, 
reengineering, and other forms of restructuring more successful. Just as any 
external business can manage its affairs better without government interfer-
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ence, these approaches are likely to work best if they originate voluntarily 
from autonomous units that are accountable for serving their clients. Manag-
ers who treat units as internal enterprises will almost invariably improve 
operations beyond their expectations. (...)  In place of forced downsizing, 
then, this bottom-up approach produces self-initiated rightsizing throughout 
the organisation- ‘self-sizing’“ (Halal 1996: 46) 
Self-dismissal, euphemistically described as “self-sizing", is a logical 
conclusion from the assumption that intrapreneurs have voluntarily slipped 
into their roles, and thus are alone responsible for their actions. At the same 
time this argument eases the burden of managers who are confronted with the 
need to justify dismissals since it either stresses the “given fact“ that a unity 
could not stand up against market pressures or since “marginal employees“ 
(“Grenzbeschäftigte“ in the double meaning as explained above) in this 
“kamikaze capitalism“ have already executed their “self-sizing“. 
Staged markets and the distribution of risk  
Consulting a different theory tradition we face another problem: Most of the 
known intrapreneur concepts can hardly be brought in line with Knight’s 
(1985 (1921)) model of the risk-seeking entrepreneur. He argues that the 
prerequisite for the entrepreneurial activity is a specific risk inclination of the 
protagonists. Insecure entrepreneurial pay in this logic represents the bonus 
for the take-over of the risk connected to economic activities. This is only not 
applied to the classic entrepreneur, but also to the intrapreneur since: “These 
employees have much in common with entrepreneurs and their venturesome-
ness. They accept personal risks to carry out a new idea” (Pinchot 1988: 100).  
Research therefore has to make the process of transforming risk-averted 
employees into risk-seeking intrapreneurs a subject of discussion. As an 
acting protagonist the intrapreneur receives resources and competences, 
either from the principal or his agents (management), to act like a genuine 
entrepreneur and like an employee at the same time. “The old employment 
relationship in which people were paid for holding a position is yielding to a 
new relationship in which people are given an opportunity to use their talents, 
with all the freedom, self-control, risks, and rewards associated with being an 
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entrepreneur“ (Halal 1994b: 13). In the theoretical tradition of Knight the 
question arises which relation is between pay and risk in such an amorphous 
constellation, to keep the potential intrapreneur inside the firm (thus: to limit 
his risk) and at the same time to guarantee the ideal of realising a proper 
handling of the property rights. The question “Should I Stay or Should I go?“ 
frequently known with the typical knowledge workers (cf.: Brinkmann 2003) 
re-appears here. Are intrapreneurs due to their features possibly representa-
tives of an exit-culture? Why should they get involved in organisational 
pressures if the large profit lures outside? Part of these pressures are organ-
isational risks like structural barriers, coagulated power structures or resis-
tance to changes. “The risk-reward trade-off for internal entrepreneurs is long 
on risk and short on reward. Why should employees risk a bruising battle 
with the defenders of the status quo when the potential payoff is so meagre?“ 
(Hamel 1999: 77). 
If one refrains from the question which risk employees are willing to ac-
cept if they are not voluntary entrepreneurs and instead focuses the relation of 
pay and risk which, much stronger than on external markets,is dependent on 
power-related organisational relations, in the end one stumbles on concepts 
like “intracapital“ or “intracapital banks“ (Pinchot 2001). These are supposed 
to stage a working market context and thus escort the making of intrapreneur-
ship. Their aim is the prevention of a “welfare loss“ of the entire organisation 
caused by a potential opportunistic behaviour of intrapreneurs overstraining 
“public goods“ or producing organisational “external effects“. The possible 
project of an intrapreneur is therefore judged by an intracapital-bank. Pinchot 
(1988: 74) depict a example of an enterprise where the intrapreneurs’ ven-
turesomeness is tested by the question: “Would you take out a second mort-
gage on your idea?“ The substitution of “performance- by the success princi-
ple“ stressed by Deutschmann (2001: 68) as an objective of the workforce 
employee has obviously a particularly strong effect on the intrapreneur’s role. 
Pinchot draws the conclusion that the intrapreneur could meet 10% of the 
costs of the project (until 20% of his pay) in case of a success, a great share 
(90%) of the outcome should used again as intracapital. This method tries to 
keep the accumulation process ongoing, but represents a restriction of the 
decision rights of the intrapreneurs, too. 
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In the end, all considerations about adequate payment forms for intrapre-
neurs only reflect the rather vague ideas about their motive structure (as 
shown above). Schumpeter’s remark that the entrepreneur enjoys his restless 
work, and that he does not live to take pleasure in the achieved, thus offers a 
logic which proves to be an old-fashioned and bulky principle in the context 
of the SMD. Carrier (1996: 12) notes that intrapreneurs strive for the classic 
material aims: promotion, access to capital shares, innovation boni, “higher 
income than elsewhere“. Duncan (1988: 19), however, suspect in a Schum-
peterian manner that advances like these do not interest them: “Intrapreneurs 
rarely have the interest or temperaments required for line and staff manage-
ment positions. (...) Intrapreneurs need freedom to create, not more responsi-
bility in managing old ideas“. And Shays (1984: 20) finally points out that 
there are also in-house barriers for an unusual payment (forms) for internal 
entrepreneurs: “Most large companies don’t like to see innovators earn 
amounts substantially more than salaried managers, even if the innovators are 
directly responsible for substantial incremental revenues.“ A monetary 
incentive system which eo ipso adapts on external markets must therefore 
first be simulated inside the organisation, and then of course it represents a 
match-ball for micropolitical power struggles reflecting the different (power) 
positions. Moreover till now, it is hardly recognisable, though, that with SMD 
and with the re-distribution of risks, a corresponding change of the bonus 
distribution comes along. Till now, problematic management actions have 
rarely produced salary cuts, and just as rarely have output-related bonuses for 
employees (except for stock option programmes) succeeded (cf. Priewe 2001: 
119).  
Whilst board executives and managers, due to stock option plans, even 
profit from cases of economic losses (e.g. by windfall profits; see critique of 
the German corporate governance commission), intrapreneurs on the other 
hand have to expect that they are made responsible for losses or failed pro-
jects due to their weaker and less protected position, even if they could not 
influence the causes like in cases of unfortunate market developments. 
It is this power based staging of an intra-organisational market, that repre-
sents the delicate subject related to Pinchot’s (1988: 43) eighth command-
ment for intrapreneurs: “It is easier to ask for forgiveness than for permis-
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sion“. This commandment postulates to start innovations and to be initiative 
instead of waiting for hierarchical instructions. This seems to be an argument 
aiming primarily at successful cases. The intrapreneur makes himself clearly 
dependent on the goodwill of his supervisors if he carries out suggestions like 
these: “The corporation and the intrapreneur must look at the contract more 
as a moral than a legal commitment. Intrapreneuring is founded on confi-
dence and trust“ (Duncan et al 1988: 20). Instead for the intrapreneur it seems 
due to the basic problem of the unclear success chances of every project 
advisable to protect himself early in case of the failure, best by having an 
influence on the rules of the micropolitical game. The more precisely the 
status of an internal entrepreneur is defined in an enterprise the less resources 
he will have to invest into the creation of internal legitimacy. The legitimisa-
tion of special clearances can relieve the intrapreneur and protect him from 
unexpected management reactions in case of his failure which is conceded in 
the literature, too: “Top-Management with its pious pronouncements and 
protestations encouraging risk taking, even if it fails, sometimes has the 
unfortunate propensity of blackballing those who do try and do fail“ (Prasad 
1993: 38).  
There is no doubt. In case of his succeeding or when there is a large “de-
mand“ for intrapreneurs,their power positions improve equally. There is 
however a well-founded suspicion that in case of a deterioration of the eco-
nomic framework conditions a fast change will occur. The bursting of the 
dot.com bubble spotlighted this: The highly qualified employees changed 
their preferences drastically in the course of the year 2000. In the February 
edition the management magazine “Chief Executive“ still predicted an “in-
trapreneur exodus“ to the New Economy (Gottenberg/Stuart 2000), and at the 
end of the year in view of the approaching recession one could note a “long-
ing for the guaranteed salary“ in the large enterprises by the same group (Der 
Spiegel, 51/2000).  
If once committed to his specific “market relations“ the intrapreneur is 
limited in his exit-possibilities, and this differentiates him from the classic 
entrepreneur. There is only one demander for his supply making him strongly 
dependent on his goodwill: “The marketplace for ideas is a monopoly: there’s 
only one buyer. There’s only one place to pitch a new idea-up the chain of 
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command: and all it takes is one nyet to kill that idea.“ On external markets 
the situation for innovators is totally different: “The hope is that if one says 
no, another will say yes“ (Hamel 1999: 77). The renunciation of the formal 
freedom to choose (as a central component of market concepts) therefore 
represents a considerable rise of risk for the intrapreneur: tied to it he is 
completely at the organisation’s mercy.  
Intrapreneurs between power and market  
On the part of economics the only “half-hearted“ market-centred restructur-
ing of organisations has occasionally been criticised. Hodgson (2001: chap. 
17) for example complains about the “staged“ character of internal markets. 
As empirical evidence shows the same can be claimed for intrapreneurship, 
too. One reason for this might be management’s or owners’ worry who see 
the new protagonist falling completely through the usual control 
grids,because from an intrapreneur’s perspective both groups almost turn into 
outsiders in relation to his projects. Often, the control of internal by external 
protagonists turns out to be a chimera (as we have shown with regards to the 
control of managers by external protagonists like funds Dörre/Brinkmann 
2005; Windolf 2008). The construction of new insiders like intrapreneurs, 
due to information asymmetry, follows the same logic scaring those who are 
in charge of control since “due to information asymmetries the intrapreneur 
knows typically more about the potential of the venture than the relevant 
resource allocators“ (Czernich 2003: 2). Therefore it can be observed that 
hierarchical and market-centred control modes do not interchange but work 
simultaneously. Form a management perspective this absolutely makes sense 
since only those power resources that are “nurtured“ by a hierarchical ar-
rangement ensure a continuing direct control over the employees and thus 
help to avoid the “control dilemma“ (Tullius 2001) appearing with the SMD. 
Therefore one has to analyse carefully, whether the top-down transfer of 
power by the management and rise of control competences claimed for the 
employees can actually be verified empirically in each case. With regards to 
the fulfilment of new participation promises this has already been questioned 
above. One starting-point for the explanation is the model idea of the “mar-
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ket“ sketched before. The disappearance of the classical power pyramid is too 
much identified with a disappearance of power as such. “From this view, the 
organisation is no longer a pyramid of power but a web of changing business 
relationships held together by clusters of internal enterprise: as in any mar-
ket“ (Halal 1996: 37). However, markets provide a form “action control“ and 
a “financial sanction mechanism“ (Heinemann 1976: 55) representing far 
more than an a-historical medium for pricing, and an arbitrarily installable 
place for the exchanging of goods. Markets are based on specific cultural and 
historical institutions and norms, rules and procedures, routines and structures 
(e.g. with regard to the intensity of the competition) which often get lost in a 
de-historicising market ontology.  
Therefore one would like to object Halal’s quotation: “as in any market“ 
there is a lot more besides a rational logic of exchange, just like the power 
(relying on external, non-market resources) of a management or the owner to 
prescribe the rules of the game. Part of this is the continued existence of a 
hierarchy during the establishing or staging of an internal market.  
Thus a number of the advocates of the intrapreneurship conception ab-
stracts too strongly from the interests of the organisational protagonists 
involved. Not all managers agree with the changing role “from boss to men-
tor“ (Shays/de Chambeau 1984: 20) not all of them actually strive for the best 
mix of control and freedom for the organisation demanded by Halal (1999): 
“Wise executives will try varying degrees of control and freedom to find that 
mix that best suits their organisations“. Against the mystification of the “new 
freedom“ one could put forward an ironic quotation, noted by Ortmann 
(1988: 20) in a different context but with a view of the persistency of intra-
organisational power relations: “On the other hand the water still flows 
downhill”. 
One further point should be mentioned here: markets do not represent 
power-free social situations, and no one can assume that decisions in internal 
markets are taken exclusively with reference to market indicators, either. 
Furthermore internal markets comprise only a part of all organisational 
interactions and contrary to different claims “rational market criteria“ often 
are not the central motives behind economic action. Poppo (1995: 1847) 
sketches some of her results: “Suppliers choose not to trade in the internal 
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market to avoid contentious haggling over profits or unfair trades“. This is 
not a completely new finding: Eccles/White (1988) had already pointed out 
that it is not only the price influencing the rationality of decisions, even if 
interactions are realised on markets: in profit centres for instance the pro-
tagonists chose the more expensive supplier just to avoid internal transac-
tions. The following paragraphs exemplify that the selection criteria of 
transaction partners can be relevant for intrapreneurs, too. 
Competition or co-operation?  
Of course, even classical hierarchically enterprises were facing intra-
organizational competition relations. These were not the central structuring 
basic concept, though. This changes in the process of the ongoing SMD in(to) 
the organisation now. The trust argument explained above points out that 
even with market centred operational relations, a high trust level promotes 
better preconditions for multi-period transactions/games (Brinkmann/Meifert 
2003) which is also true for intrapreneurs who are dependent on highly 
cooperative forms of operational relations, since they are the ones who are 
expected to establish those “new combinations“ between different operational 
units due to their ability for innovation: “Intrapreneurs also use social capital 
to build support for their projects and gain legitimacy within the organisation. 
This social capital is usually embedded in trust.“ (Zahra et al 1999: 183; 
Wolcott/Lippitz 2010).  
The search for the intrapreneur-“teamworker“ (Reitz 1998) who, due to 
his innovative power, exceeds the traditional intraorganisational demarca-
tions (“demarcation crossing made easy”, Pinchot 1988: 276), is therefore 
understandable, but is in contrast to Schumpeter’s objectives of the entrepre-
neur: “His motives are quite egotistical,– even in the meaning of ‘increased 
egoism’, inconsiderateness. He is lacking tradition and relations; he gets 
things moving by breaking all ties“ (Schumpeter 1997 (1911): 134). His 
“ability for single-handed efforts“ (130) is a feature that supporters of the 
intrapreneurship refer to. They emphasize the specific basic attitudes of the 
“lone fighter“ (Pinchot) who does not seem to feel a sense of belonging in co-
operation relations. How else could one understand the intrapreneurship 
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commandments 2, 3 and 6 set up by Pinchot: “(2) Avoid all orders which can 
stop your dream. (3) Do anything necessary for the realisation of your aim, 
no matter what your actual task description looks. (6) Try to stay under-
ground as long as possible, too early publicity could mobilise the immune 
system of the enterprise“. Those who act faithfully according to these max-
ims do suspect (perhaps for good reasons) an obstruction of his idea behind 
every bush. On the other hand, however, trust theory teaches that strongly 
opportunistic acting destroys trust and co-operation relations (Brink-
mann/Seifert 2001).  
In the end the extolled work in this “underground“ represents a specific 
version of protection within unstable transaction relations. Intrapreneurship 
thus aggravates the problem of a potential neglect of the co-operation aspects 
existing anyway in competition relations, because intrapreneurs almost 
inevitably reproduce those information asymmetries with the acceptance of a 
responsibility for the resources used. Principal-agent theory has explained 
that information asymmetries can cause a misinterpretation of pros and 
contras by market participants, or a misuse of such imbalances leading to the 
discrimination of one of the parties.  
So Akerlofs (1970) “lemons“ problem re-appears here in a varied version, 
indicating the danger for the necessary trust level. The founding of transac-
tion cost-minimising trust is not uncomplicated in competitive contexts. One 
can doubt with North (1992) whether with the new costs (for information 
procurement, control, signalling and screening) a favoured market solution 
actually represents a more efficient solution and thus would not increase the 
transaction costs instead. This constellation gets particularly “explosive“ 
considering that the potential intrapreneurs who are expected to build coali-
tions in the organisations actually forge coalitions with this attitude: with 
regards towards a management that is possibly sceptical due to insecure 
prospects of intrapreneur projects and their own shrinking control capacities, 
and that has to experience at the same time that its own position is endan-
gered by the freedom granted intrapreneurs who can be expected to be un-
willing to subordinate themselves as traditional employees did.  
Empirical research gives some hints and cases (for example in the context 
of setting up lean production, see Dörre 2002), when a suspicious manage-
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ment dumped far more powerful constellations than the project of an intra-
preneur. Their resistance towards a hierarchical subordination therefore was 
one of the first doubts expressed in the debate on internal entrepreneurship: 
“This reaction to authority is the very style of entrepreneurship and makes 
this person a weak link in the chain of command in the corporate hierarchy of 
authority“ (Ross 1987: 25). 
With regards to their “former“ colleagues intrapreneurs might get unpopu-
lar, too: As creative destructors they break “through the automatism of a 
balanced circulation“ (Schumpeter 1997 (1911): 112) and  
a)  represent a threat to positional and functional traditions if they, as an-
nounced by theory for example begin to do a market research on their own 
or if they  
b)  use scarce resources in direct competition to other employees.  
Thus Pinchot gives the advice to the management (on his homepage) to trust 
the intrapreneurs and to give them all support of a material and personnel 
kind they demand: “Since resources are not infinite, managers may have to 
take these things away from other people who are not intrapreneurs.“ In this 
situation, intrapreneurs might invest a high part of their time and resources in 
complicated internal exchange processes to escape isolation or even boycott 
by other employees (Prasad 1993).  
Market-centred disintegration and cultural reintegration? 
The process of shifting the market demarcations into or within organisations 
produces different dis-integrative and centrifugal tendencies. At the same the 
integrative effect of a common organisational goal sinks, if the specific sub-
entities of the enterprise gradually follow their own logics. Again this is not a 
completely new phenomenon, but in the past this was not an intended effect 
of managerial decisions. 
However, in how far can this fluid phenomenon of autonomous units 
called “enterprise“ or “organisation” be distinguished from a “normal“ 
market place? Since Coase (1937) the question about “market or organisa-
tion“ is answered by institutional economics in this way: the transactions 
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necessary for the construction of goods take place in an enterprise, and not on 
the market, if the sum of the production and transaction costs is lower in the 
enterprise than on the market. Therefore internal markets represent a logical 
break in this wide-spread organisational theory. So one can fully agree with 
Ellig (2001: 230) in this consideration: “If administrative direction minimises 
transaction costs, there seems little justification for wholesale replication of 
market institutions inside the boundaries of the firm. On the other hand, if 
introduction of prizes can improve upon administrative resource allocation, 
then downsizing seems more appropriate than internal markets.“ Among the 
advocates of the intrapreneurship conception this dichotomist logic under-
goes a shift towards an as-well-as-maxim, since they do neither want to do 
without the advantages of the market nor without the organisational form 
“enterprise“. Virtually they therefore might answer the famous question 
“Make or Make“ with the motto “Make and buy!" 
What does this mean with regards to the phenomenon of organisational 
disintegration? The loosening of former obligations to the common goal often 
takes place in two typical steps: At first there is the creation of market-
centred entities, like centre structures, that are still focused on a predefined 
direction but already following own logics since they have to fulfil perform-
ance duties. Intrapreneurship represents a step forward. It is the explicit 
programme to leave traditional processes and products behind in the context 
of creative destruction and to pursue one’s own goals. 
One can learn a lot about the advantages of market centred organisations 
(like innovation and adaptation speed), but can find very little about the 
problem of patching up enterprises that are drifting apart. As a rule, there are 
generally two argumentative strings: First there is the classic faith in the 
invisible hand of the market occasionally modernized by insertions of chaos 
theory: “To use a phrase from chaos theory, the central advantage of an 
internal market system is that it ‘creates spontaneous order out of chaos’“ 
(Halal 1996: 49). One can object that this is rather a market balance and less 
an organisational order. Thus the attempt to found an intra-organisational 
cohesion is expected somewhere else: Great hopes focus on a connecting and 
obligatory common norm set within the enterprise: the corporate culture.  
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Certainly, the worry over organisational cohesion was part of the debate 
about internal entrepreneurship from the beginning (Fisher 1984), but the 
more it became clear that entrepreneurial activities within the enterprise 
consist not least in breaking traditional norms and that intrapreneurial free-
doms more than everything else means to remove many classic organisational 
ties, the louder the call for an integrative corporate culture as (Prasad 1993) 
as centripetal power was. 
As Halal puts it: “Social norms support the enterprising infrastructure. (...) 
an internal market must be augmented by an entrepreneurial culture that 
stresses individual initiative, change, and mutual support“ (Halal 1994a: 76). 
“Emancipated from bureaucratic barriers” the new intrapreneur thus shall be 
put in new controllable bonds. In this way the disintegrative conception of an 
enterprise consisting of internal markets is backed up by the integrating 
concept of “Vergemeinschaftung“ in a common “Culture club“ (Ellig 2001: 
235) to stop a possible costly opportunism: “As a set of constraints both 
internal and external to agents, corporate culture reduces static transactions 
costs by reducing opportunism. Opportunities for opportunism may arise, but 
agents refrain from taking advantage of them because engaging in opportun-
istic behaviour imposes psychic disutility, is punished by social sanction or is 
perceived to be inconsistent with their long-term best interests. (...) Corporate 
culture reduces these (dynamic transaction) costs by giving people in the 
same organisation a similar set of mental models and visions“ (ibid.). The 
protagonists of the SMD remind one of Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice, 
causing great trouble since he could not get rid of the spirits he himself had 
called before. Like the brooms there the Intrapreneurs can no longer be 
controlled, either. And instead of the “master“ one tries to control them now 
by using the integrative power of a common normative background: “Prepare 
the organisation by shaping a culture that fosters enterprise“ (Halal 1994a: 
81). In this theoretical tradition corporate culture as a restrictive frame work 
clearly represents an important distinction between internal and external 
markets. Though, and here critique starts, these ideologies of “Vergemein-
schaftung“ must virtually abstract from traditional and newly-arising antago-
nisms of interests. Thus the most important task of management is seen in the 
creation of a “corporate community“ to limit the problematic effects of 
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markets. On the one hand one can wonder about the under-complex way 
problems induced by markets are described (just like the relation between 
self-interest and “common“ interests). On the other hand this corporate 
culture concept takes a path which was already described as a functionalist 
dead end (Brinkmann 2002).  
Two different speeds: intrapreneurs and the shareholder value capitalism  
Finally clear dis-functionalities of the intrapreneurship concept come to light 
if one discusses them in the context of the common shareholder orientation. 
As shown above, an advantage of internal markets for the management is 
seen in the simplification of control, by an output orientation underlying cost 
calculations to the internal units as clear as possible. This advantage is lost in 
intrapreneuring since the output, the result of the open process of creative 
destruction is necessarily insecure, after all the missing possibility to plan 
innovation was a central starting point of the approach. And investments by 
intrapreneurs are just different from “normal“ investments, since they do not 
represent simple prolongations of old ways (Czernich 2003). “Are some units 
suffering losses? A market would let them fail because they do not produce 
value“. Halal’s (1994a: 79) claim is therefore full of prerequisite, and doubts 
about the actual possibility of calculating the “value adding“ of a profit centre 
or the costs of decentralisation are part of the debate from the beginning (e.g. 
Eccles/White 1988). Due to the uncertain contribution to the increase in value 
of an enterprise and due to its high ambiguity (one should consider the am-
biguous and unclear start of such a project) intrapreneurship seems so to be 
an obvious alien element in the shareholder concept. 
Moreover shareholder value’s short term orientation is a fundamental con-
tradiction to intrapreneurship whose investments can pay off only in long 
terms since the development of a new product, a new technology or a new 
market is always a long-term project: In some cases it can last for several 
years until an innovation can be commercialised effectively if at all. 
This short term perspective might lead to other results with risk-conscious 
intrapreneurs than with employees/workers; due to the personal responsibility 
and/or participation they are particularly susceptible to an intimidation of 
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resource withdrawal or in the metaphorical language of the consultants: 
“Nervous money makes the innovations expensive and inefficient. It keeps 
the intraprise from performing well and will lead to its failure“ (Pinchot 
1988: 270; for a critique: Dörre 2002: part 4: 2.2). The speed of shareholder 
capitalism, and the intrapreneurs’ dependence on external decisions, represent 
another high-risk context: the high frequency of changes in the management. 
The loss of a supporter can mean a fast end to the project: at least sustainable 
working is always endangered. “Too often a manager who promotes them 
leaves the intrapreneurs already before the project bears fruit“ Pinchot (1988: 
272) puts it. Since the publication of his book this facet of the problem has 
intensified considerably, his plea for a “long-term thinking“ (ibid.) therefore 
sounds rather helpless from a today’s perspective. There is even a more 
unfavourable phenomenon: the larger the enterprises and the stronger they 
are dependent on the capital market, the stronger they are exposed to a share-
holder orientation and the imperatives of financialisation, both representing 
short term orientations. This means: particularly those enterprises that, due to 
their bureaucratic structure, hope for revival by intrapreneurs, offer rather bad 
prerequisites for their work. 
4.3 An intrapreneurship-society?  
If one returns to the origins of the approach of internal markets and intrapre-
neurs, one recalls that the central assertion was to transfer a process from the 
society level (perestroika) into the organisation: “Markets can be chaotic, but 
they are spreading around the globe because they excel over the other alterna-
tive, central planning, whether in communist governments or capitalist 
corporations. In both nations and organisations, planned economies are too 
cumbersome to cope with a complex new era, while free enterprise, either 
internal or external, offers an economic philosophy able to produce adaptive 
change rapidly and efficiently“ (Halal 1996: 34). In a reversed direction some 
authors develop a societal “utopia“ starting from an organisation level. 
After the market approach was first used in a rather defensive manner, this 
changed in the course of the debate since “this is the philosophical foundation 
that gave birth to the United States and that has been bringing down dictator-
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ship after dictatorship in recent years“ (Halal 1997: 18). A societal ideal 
suddenly arises from a simple restructuring concept for trimming oganisa-
tional economic units to be more innovative and efficient. The central term of 
this reassignment is an equation of society and organisation: “It is useful to 
compare organisational economies with national economies because the same 
principle applies“ (Halal 1994a: 78).  
In Pinchot’s (1988: 365) view intrapreneurs advance from protagonists of 
an organisational perestroika to protagonists of hope and liberty for the whole 
society, though his texts give only some hints: “At a much smaller level the 
enterprises are also confronted with all these questions. Till now, they were 
organised if they wanted to answer them with the structure of a socialist state. 
The enterprise owns the means of production and takes care of the employ-
ees. (…) So the work of the intrapreneurs is not only a method to increase the 
standard of innovation and productivity in organisations although of course 
this is also the case. It is more important that it is a way of organising large-
scale enterprises so that the individual can make full of joy a contribution to 
the life of society again“ (ibid.).  
In his later publications Halal has developed the basic idea further: “While 
the ‘80s focused on the need to free economies from government control, 
now the crucial need is to redefine the role of business vis-à-vis society“ 
(2002: 272). Now he advertises this market centred, “democratic enterprise“ 
with its intrapreneurs as a foil for the entire society: “If corporations further 
develop this quasi-democratic form of governance, business could be trans-
formed into an institution designed to serve both capital and soci-
ety"(Halal/Taylor 2002: 270).  
This upgrading of entrepreneurial freedom as a constitutive societal prin-
ciple, and its mistaking for democracy, is a direct result of the false estima-
tion of market-centred association and a fatal undervaluation of several extra-
economic factors of “Vergesellschaftung“. It would require an additional text 
to get in more details. Here it can be noted that it is certainly not a functional 
concept for societies not least because it has already proved to be a dysfunc-
tional at the organisation level.  
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5.  Summary 
This text discusses the concept of the internal entrepreneur as a special case 
of the marketisation of organisations or rather and more precisely: of the 
organisational SMD (shifting of market demarcations) which has become 
more and more popular in the last two decades. As a consequence of the 
breakdown of the planned economies in 1989-91 market and entrepreneur-
ship experienced a strong revival. In the following decades these concept 
were transferred to intra-corporate contexts as “internal markets“ and – which 
was in the focus of this text: “intrapreneurship“. 
The supporters of intrapreneurship offer far-reaching promises, raising 
high expectations towards solutions to efficiency problems, reduction of costs 
and improvement innovations. The employees affected are promised more 
justice, improved self-realization as an intrapreneur, a better self-
determination and organisational participation in the “corporate community“ 
of the “democratic enterprise“ (Halal 1996: Chapter 3). 
Models are often symbolic constructions, and particularly the half-life pe-
riod of management models within the last few years has proved to be short 
(Deutschmann 1997: 57). Thus one could expect the intrapreneur to fade 
from the scene after a while, especially if one considers that his longer-term 
orientation considerably differs from the short term thinking of the share-
holder approach. Nevertheless the accurate fit to SMD might produce a 
relative stability, though. It might prolong his persistency considerably if the 
intrapreneur actually turns out to become a new role model. However this 
would presuppose certain compromises (one should consider the slow devel-
opment of the fordist “normal worker“ as a former role model) that could 
stand at the end of a long micropolitical conflict about the rules of the game 
of intrapreneurship. 
However, in view of the internal inconsistencies and incompatibilities of 
the concept discussed above a postfordist compromise with the intrapreneur 
in its centre still seems improbable. Scepticism prevails, because the prom-
ises of democracy, participation and freedom are closely connected to the 
question concerning the voluntariness of intrapreneurship, and concerning its 
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operational arranging, especially the distribution of incentives and risks. 
Today, it often seems as if, with the market demarcations, primarily the risks 
are shifted, too. While formerly the organisation membership was provided 
with far-reaching rights the zone of precariousness now reaches deep into the 
organisations (Brinkmann et al. 2006; see the first chapter by Dörre in 
Dörre/Lessenich/Rosa 2009). Thus if intrapreneurship only serves to load the 
employees with risks and output-responsibility (and this danger is obvious) 
the concept might have no great future since it can hardly gain hegemonic 
support by the respective empoloyees. 
In general the reference to the entrepreneurship model within intrapre-
neurship concepts is rather contradictory: often it is neither a voluntary 
entrepreneurial involvement; the information provided, let alone the compe-
tences and resources granted do not at all correspond to the high risk and 
responsibility assignment (within the organisation and also toward oneself) 
that occasionally comes up to the one of managers. The same can be noted 
with regards to the payment according to bonus systems. Against this back-
drop intrapreneurship might imply potential conflict and develop intra-
organisational opposition; if one considers its hidden if not subversive char-
acter: its managerial advocates will have to put up with the claims that might 
be stirred up with their promises: granting intrapreneurs the necessary free-
dom not only verbally but also de facto.  
The amorphous role definition of the dominant protagonists is one of the 
key problems of the approach discussed. It confronts him/her with incom-
patible and virtually indissoluble role demands. Problems in the balancing of 
co-operation and competition which make the model sway from demanding 
the lone fighter and the team worker at the same time remain unresolved, too. 
This leads to the difficulty: whether and how a social context consisting of 
intrapreneurs can provide cohesion and commitment in the long run, or in 
other words: which relation of inclusion and exclusion will be striven for? 
Can stability at all be attained under the conditions of permanent intra-
organisational demarcation violations? In any case these problems are not 
soluble with a cursory corporate culture initiative to found cohesion since its 
instrumental character will hardly be overseen.  
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Altogether, the approach reveals a selective understanding of market un-
derestimating the intrapreneur’s involvement in micropolitics and the rele-
vance of ongoing conflicts of antagonistic interests. Still the question remains 
unanswered: Why should conflicts of interest not arise newly and at a new 
level after a market centred reorganisation?  
Therefore fantasies of “Vergemeinschaftung“ as an organisational model 
must be regarded critically. Moreover: They prove to be completely unsuit-
able if “enlarged“ from the corporate level to the society as a whole, mani-
festing only a limited (neoliberal) understanding of democracy and ignoring 
the massive failure and scepticism of market-centred restructuring of society 
as in post-1989 Eastern Europe or during the current financial crisis (see 
Brinkmann/Pickshaus/Satzer 2011). Thus one could rather suspect the oppo-
site: At least for some occupational groups Sennett’s (2002; 2006) fears that 
the ubiquitous flexibility demand threatens to lead to a social disintegration 
with corresponding consequences for a democratic participation already seem 
to have become true, no matter if one defines the protagonists as intrapre-
neurs or still as flexible employees. 
A generalisation of the approach, however, might possibly lead to a politi-
cisation in a sense of resistance: Lehndorff (2002: 46) could be right if he 
suspects that stimulus for a political/societal questioning of the postfordist 
production model might come into being not from the organisational level, 
but from its interweaving with the whole society. 
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